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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a), because this is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the district court's 
entry of summary judgment on Harris's claim for negligence and 
remanded that claim for trial? 
b. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the district court's 
entry of summary judgment on Harris's claim for breach of contract 
and remanded that claim for trial? 
For both of these issues, the standard of review is correctness. "When exercising [its] 
certiorari jurisdiction, [this Court] review[s] the decision of the court of appeals and not 
that of the trial court. On certiorari, [this court] review[s] the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness." See Collins v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, 
f l l ,52P.3dl267. 
The underlying standard of review is provided by Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under 
that rule, summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court of appeals applied "the 
same standard as that applied by the trial court." Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 
1334 (Utah 1977). On certiorari review, this Court applies the same underlying standard, 
but grants the decision of the court of appeals no deference. 
These issues were preserved in the trial court for appeal. See R. at 118 
(Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment), 140-222 (Defendants' Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, and Exhibits), 230-411 (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, and Exhibits), 467 
(Minute Entry), 483-88 (Ruling), and 504 (Transcript of Oral Argument). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Harris is unaware of any constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or 
regulations determinative of his claims against Rick Albrecht or the Rick Albrecht 
Insurance Agency, Inc. One state statute is relevant to Harris's claims against State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company, namely, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305(2), That statute 
reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
There is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is bound by any act of 
its agent performed in this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual 
(express or implied) or apparent authority, until the insurer has canceled the 
agent's appointment and has made reasonable efforts to recover from the 
agent its policy forms and other indicia of agency. Reasonable efforts 
include a formal demand in writing for return of the indicia, and notice to 
the commissioner if the agent does not promptly comply with the demand. 
This Subsection (2) neither waives any common law defense available to 
insurers, nor precludes the insured from seeking redress against the agent 
individually or jointly against the insurer and agent. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The complaint in this case was filed in Fourth District Court in Provo on May 18, 
1998. See R. at 10. On or about May 3, 2000, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and an accompanying memorandum of law. See id. at 118, 140-222. On or 
about June 30, 2000, Harris filed a memorandum of law opposing Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment. See id- at 230-411. On or about September 18, 2000, 
Defendants submitted a reply memorandum in support of their motion. See id. at 416-57. 
The district court heard oral argument on Defendants' motion on October 11, 2000. See 
id. at 467. At the hearing, in a ruling from the bench, the district court granted 
Defendants' motion. See id. On or about November 3, 2000, the district court reduced 
its ruling to writing. See id. at 484-88. On or about November 17, 2000, the district 
court entered a cost judgment in favor of Defendants. See id. at 489-90. On November 
29, 2000, Harris filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's written ruling of 
November 3, 2000, see id. at 491-93, and on December 15, 2000, Harris filed an 
Amended Notice of Appeal in order to incorporate the district court's November 17, 2000 
cost judgment in this appeal, see id. at 500-02. 
During the spring and summer of 2001, the parties briefed the case before the Utah 
Court of Appeals. The matter came before the Court of Appeals for oral argument on 
November 20, 2001. On April 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals issued its decision 
reversing the district court's entry of summary judgment, and remanding the case to the 
district court for trial. .See Harris v. Albrecht 2002 UT App 98, 46 P.3d 241. 
On May 13, 2002, Albrecht filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court. 
On July 5, 2002, this Court granted the writ. See Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Ken Harris and His Business Experience 
Harris is an architect with over 35 years of experience in the field, having begun 
his career in the mid-1960s at a firm known as Dixon & Long. See R. at 354. In 1981, 
he was made a partner in the Dixon firm, after which time the firm was known as Dixon 
and Harris Architects. Id. at 353-54. In 1987, Harris formed a separate company, known 
as Harris and Olsen Architects, id. at 352-53, and, in 1990, the name of the business was 
changed to Ken Harris Architect, id. at 351. 
When Harris was a partner in Dixon and Harris, Mr. Dixon handled the business 
portion of the partnership, including decisions regarding whether to purchase business 
insurance. Id. at 353. After leaving Dixon and Harris, Harris handled such business 
decisions for his own companies, but elected not to purchase business insurance in the 
early years because the business was small at that time and Harris didn't have much to 
insure. Id. at 351. By way of illustration, at the time he began Ken Harris Architect in 
1990, Harris was using materials inherited/purchased from Mr. Dixon that were manu-
factured in the late 1950s. Id. By 1990, the inherited architectural equipment was "used 
up" and "worn out" and was of little value, and Harris did not see a need to insure it. Id. 
Beginning in 1990, and over the next few years, Harris's business grew and the 
business got "busier and busier." Id. To keep up with the growth in his business, in the 
mid-1990s Harris hired several new employees, see id. at 345, and made a "tremendous 
investment in equipment," id. at 350. Harris refurbished the whole office with new 
equipment, including new furniture, new desks, new chairs, new drafting work-stations, a 
custom-built desk for himself, a new conference table and chairs, and new wall cabinets. 
Id. In addition, Harris added to the office at least 30 framed architectural renderings of 
work performed by the office over the years, each worth over $1,000.00. Id. Around this 
same time, Harris purchased seven new top-of-the-line CAD drafting computers, two 
plotters, a scanner, large copy machines and a new phone system. Id. The business had 
undergone a "big change" from drafting on table-tops using T-squares and triangles to a 
system of computer-oriented CAD drafting and design. Id. In Harris's mind, this was 
done to have Ken Harris Architect be the best architectural firm in Provo. Id. 
In the summer of 1997, after all of the above-listed purchases and upgrades to the 
business, Harris made the decision to purchase business insurance for Ken Harris 
Architect Id. at 330-31. 
B. Rick Albrecht and His Business Experience 
Rick Albrecht ("Albrecht") received his insurance license in 1985, id. at 303, and 
he has done business through the Rick Albrecht Insurance Agency, Inc. ("the Agency") 
since 1988, id. at 301. The Agency sells insurance exclusively through the State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Company ("State Farm"), meaning that Albrecht and the Agency can sell 
everything that State Farm offers, but cannot sell anything other than State Farm 
products. Id. at 304. Albrecht has personal "binding authority" (within his limits) from 
State Farm for all of State Farm's policies, including commercial policies. Id. at 290. 
Albrecht has received training from State Farm regarding various types of 
insurance policies, including business policies. Id. at 304. Because of his experience and 
training, Albrecht believes he is a "skilled" insurance agent and is at least more skillful 
than 50% of all insurance agents. Id. at 302-03. He believes that he is competent and is 
qualified and knowledgeable to write and sell fire insurance. Id. at 275. 
Albrecht acknowledges that, in addition to insurance coverage and products, he is 
also selling service to his clients. Id. at 290. Albrecht agrees that, over time, his clients 
typically learn to trust him and rely upon him, and to rely on the fact that he will sell 
them competitive products. Id. Albrecht agrees that, as an agent for each of his clients, 
he has a responsibility to do the following: 
(a) fill the needs of, and get the appropriate kind of insurance for, the 
individual client, id. at 289; 
(b) get the best insurance available pursuant to the instructions of the 
client, id.; 
(c) follow-up with every client who has asked for insurance so that the 
process is finished up and the insurance is in place, id. at 287; and 
(d) to inform the client—out of "common sense," if nothing else—if 
they are ineligible for coverage or if the agent will be unable to 
procure the insurance coverage, id. at 292. 
According to Albrecht, he, as an agent, would "rapidly" notify an existing client if, for 
whatever reason (such as, he had "[insufficient information"), the requested insurance 
could not be procured, so that the client would not be exposed to a loss without insurance 
coverage. Id. at 287, 292. 
C. The Relationship Between Harris and Albrecht 
In 1989, Harris's brother-in-law, who was also in the insurance business, referred 
Harris to Albrecht for his auto insurance needs. Harris's brother-in-law highly 
recommended Albrecht, and stated that Albrecht had a good reputation in the insurance 
community. Id. at 286, 354-55. The first contact between Harris and Albrecht occurred 
in 1989, and was a telephone conversation. Harris called and asked if he could place 
insurance coverage on his automobiles. In response, Albrecht said that such insurance 
could be procured. Harris gave Albrecht the information Albrecht asked for in relation to 
the coverage, and Albrecht placed the coverage with State Farm. Id. at 340-41. 
After that, Harris also ordered homeowners coverage from Albrecht, id. at 341, 
354-55, and some time later, Harris also purchased boat insurance, R.V. insurance, and a 
liability umbrella policy from Albrecht, id. at 342. Finally, Harris also purchased 
homeowners coverage for his new home from Albrecht. Id. at 285, 333. Over the years 
there were times when Ken Harris had four or five different automobiles, plus boats, 
R.V.s, and homes, insured through Albrecht. Id. at 342. 
Harris did not initially "shop around" for insurance coverage or pricing, because 
Albrecht came highly recommended. Id. at 341. Even in later years, Harris did not 
"quiz" Albrecht about the price of every policy he purchased, because over the years, 
through their many dealings, Harris had come to believe that Albrecht would treat him 
fairly and had confidence that Albrecht would timely obtain a good product at a 
reasonable price. Id. at 329. According to Harris, the two men "rarely" discussed the 
particulars of the various coverages Harris sought to obtain from Albrecht. Id. at 337. 
As a rule, the relationship between Harris and Albrecht was almost exclusively 
telephonic. Id. at 274, 331. The two "rarely met face-to-face, if ever." Id. at 285-86, 
336. The parties do remember at least one occasion where they met face-to-face, see id. 
at 286, 340, but Harris estimates that 95-98% of all business between Harris and Albrecht 
was conducted over the phone, id. at 340. Over the years, according to Harris, the two 
men talked on the phone "every couple of months." Id. at 325. Albrecht estimates that, 
at least four times a year, he or his staff would speak with Harris. Id. at 279. All billings 
or applications were by mail from Albrecht to Harris.1 Id. at 285. Over the years, this 
system worked very well for Harris and Albrecht, and was the same system in place 
between Albrecht and Harris's children, who also telephoned Albrecht from time to time 
regarding their insurance needs. Id. at 284-85. 
Harris described the relationship as follows: "I had a relationship with Rick; he 
took care of me , . . . he worked hard to answer my questions. And when I had a vehicle 
to cover, to place, he placed it every single time." Id. at 331. Harris "would call Mr. 
Albrecht and tell him what I needed, tell him I changed a car, I added a car, my child 
wanted to insure a car. I had added a motor home, I had added a boat or I bought a boat, 
tell him to place the coverage, and he would do it." Id. Over time, Harris gained trust 
and confidence in Albrecht. Id. Albrecht recalls that Harris did not have to ride or push 
Albrecht to make requested changes, modifications or additions to the insurance 
coverage. Id at 273. Harris stated that "never once in all the time that we have done 
business, not once have 1 ever had to call Rick Albrecht back and say, what happened? 
Where is this? Where's my bill? Not once did he ever give me concern to worry about 
what I'd asked him to do." Id. at 328; id. at 326 (stating that "I never worried about his 
part of the business and what he should be doing, I absolutely never did that"). 
Over the years, as Harris received billings from State Farm on the various insurance 
policies obtained through Albrecht, he paid them. Some of the billings were annual, and 
some were semi-annual. Id. at 343. As a matter of course, Harris did not review each 
mailing and/or billing for specific coverage or declarations from State Farm because 
Harris "had an insurance agent that took care of that for [him]." Id. 
Over time, it became Harris's practice to listen to Albrecht's recommendations 
and to rely upon Albrecht's knowledge of the product and of Harris's situation. Id. at 
339. Typically, Harris followed Albrecht's recommendations. Id. Albrecht believed that 
Harris and Harris's family members trusted him, and that they had good reason to trust 
and rely upon his expertise as an insurance agent. Id. at 273. In fact, Albrecht agreed 
that, based upon the parties' long-standing business relationship, Harris would be 
reasonably justified to rely upon Albrecht to place coverage that was ordered and to 
believe that there was coverage in place. Id. at 271, 273. 
D. The Conversations Relating to Business Insurance 
Harris vaguely remembers that, on one occasion early in their relationship, 
Albrecht brought up the subject of business insurance, and Harris asked Albrecht to "look 
into it for him." Id. at 335. For the reasons set forth above, however, Harris did not elect 
to purchase business insurance at that time. Id. at 334-35. 
The next time that the two men discussed insurance for the architect business was 
in mid-summer 1997, after Harris had made substantial new investments in his company. 
Id. at 330. Harris remembers this conversation as a "very short conversation" in which 
Harris "called Mr. Albrecht and told him I wanted him to place business coverage on my 
office and its contents, and he said okay, he would take care of that, he would come out 
and look at the equipment." Id. Harris described the exchange as a "typical 
conversation" between the two men, in that, over the years, whenever "I had a need, I 
called him, asked him to fill the need, and he'd said okay and do it." Id. Harris stated 
that "whatever I needed, whenever I called on an insurance related item, I would call Mr. 
Albrecht, tell him what I needed, and he would take care of it every single time. He 
never let me down except for this last time." Id. 
Following this phone call and order to Albrecht, Harris felt and thought that his 
business had insurance coverage. Id. Following the phone call, Harris was confident that 
"it was over," cross that off the checklist as "that one's done," "forget about that one." 
Id. "I had called him—I did my thing—I called Rick, told him to take care of it. He's 
always done it before, he took care of me every time, he would do it again." Id. 
E. The Fire 
On December 1, 1997, a fire destroyed the building in which Ken Harris Architect 
was located. That day, from the scene of the fire, Harris used his cell phone to call 
Albrecht. During the phone call, Harris described to Albrecht the events of standing 
there watching his building burn down to the ground. Id. at 320. During the conver-
sation, Harris asked Albrecht about business insurance coverage. Id. Harris said "You 
placed that coverage we talked about, didn't you?" Id. Albrecht replied that "We talked 
about it, Ken, but we never did anything about it." Id.; see also id. at 276-77. These 
tidings "absolutely devastated" Harris, and he was in a "state of shock after that." Id. 
In this conversation, Albrecht said he would check to make sure that business 
insurance had not been procured. Id. at 319. Albrecht called back within an hour and 
told Harris that, for certain, there was no coverage. Id. Several days later Harris called 
Albrecht and asked if Harris's homeowners policy had any coverage for the fire, and 
Albrecht looked it up and informed Harris that it did not. Id. at 318. 
F. Elements of a Business/Commercial Policy 
As stated above, Albrecht has binding authority, within limits, on all polices he 
sells, including commercial policies. Id. at 290. According to Albrecht, who was relying 
upon a State Farm sales brochure typically provided to potential customers seeking 
business insurance (id. at 360-65), the general categories of coverage applicable to an 
business office would be: 
(a) "office furniture" (includes computers, drafting tables); id. at 280-81 
(b) "valuable papers and records"; id. at 2812 
(c) "Property of others" up to $2500.00; id. at 280 
(d) "loss of income; id., and 
(e) "extra expense", id. 
As a State Farm agent, Albrecht has binding authority granted to him by State 
Farm. Id. at 261, 263-64. If an agent binds a business policy and the total amount of 
exposure to State Farm exceeds $100,000, then the Field Underwriter is notified by the 
company to inspect the business. Id. at 244. The policy is "bound" and remains in effect 
while the underwriter surveys the business to see if any loss control measures are neces-
sary. Id. at 243. If such measures are deemed necessary, then the insured is notified to 
put the measures in place within 90 days or the coverage will be terminated. Id. 
Using a damage summary prepared by Harris, State Farm's Field Underwriter for 
the Utah area, Dick Mirabelli, identified items that could have been covered under a State 
Farm Insurance business policy. Id. at 239-41. After a review of each category, the only 
2
 Albrecht claimed to have a $15,000.00 binding limit, id- at 281, when in fact it was 
actually a $25,000.00 binding limit as per the State Farm documents and the testimony of 
Dick Mirabelli, the Field Underwriter for the Utah area of State Farm, id. at 263, 358. 
ones that were questionable were any that could be characterized as personal property 
and not business property. All other categories were deemed eligible and subject to 
coverage. Id. at 239. General categories that were not questioned were losses in the area 
of furniture (business personal property such as computers), loss of income, property of 
others, and valuable papers. Id. at 239-41. 
Using the same damage exhibit, Mirabelli next went back through the list of losses 
and identified any that would require loss control measures, e.g., regarding the storage, 
protection and back-up/copies of items to be covered under the policy. Id. at 239. The 
area of "valuable papers" was identified as needing loss control measures, id., and there 
would need to have been an endorsement on the fire-related loss of income, id- at 238. 
Mirabelli explained that his own authority is $5 million (all coverages under a 
business policy combined) under these circumstances. Id. at 261. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In mid-summer 1997, Harris telephoned Albrecht and personally asked him to 
procure insurance for Harris's architectural business. Albrecht responded to Harris's 
request by assuring Harris that he would take care of the request and would procure the 
requested insurance. Accepting these basic facts as true, as it must for the purposes of 
this appeal, this Court must conclude that the district court erred in entering summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants, and that the court of appeals was correct in reversing 
the judgment of the district court and remanding the case for trial. 
Harris asserts two separate and independent causes of action against Defendants in 
this case, and genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided on each one. First, 
Harris claims that Albrecht (and, vicariously, State Farm) breached his duty to Harris by 
failing to procure insurance that he promised to procure. As soon as an insurance agent 
agrees to procure insurance for a client, that agent has a legal duty to follow the 
instructions of the client by either (1) procuring the requested insurance, or (2) notifying 
the client of the agent's inability to procure the insurance. In this case, Albrecht did 
neither—he failed to procure the requested insurance, and also failed to follow up with 
Harris in any manner whatsoever, whether to gather additional information, to tell Harris 
that the insurance could not be procured, or for any other purpose. Under these 
circumstances, genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided by the jury regarding 
Albrecht's breach of duty. Therefore, the district court's decision on this point was 
erroneous, and the court of appeals was correct to reverse that decision and remand the 
case for a determination as to whether Albrecht breached his duty to Harris. 
Second, Harris claims that Albrecht (and, vicariously, State Farm) breached a 
contract with Harris to procure insurance for Harris's business. When Harris asked 
Albrecht to procure the business insurance, and Albrecht assured Harris that he would 
take care of the request, a contract to procure insurance was formed. By failing to 
procure the requested insurance, and by failing to even call Harris to follow-up or to 
inform him that he could not procure the insurance, Albrecht breached this contract to 
procure insurance. At a minimum, genuine issues of material fact remain to be decided 
by the jury regarding Albrecht's breach of this contract. Therefore, the district court's 
decision on this point was erroneous, and the court of appeals was correct to reverse that 
decision and remand the case for a determination as to whether Albrecht breached the 
contract to procure insurance. 
Finally, the district court also entered summary judgment in favor of State Farm. 
This decision was also erroneous, and the court of appeals correctly reversed that 
decision, because under Utah law an insurer "is bound by any act of its agent performed 
in this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual (express or implied) or apparent 
authority." See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305. State Farm is bound by Albrecht's 
actions, and therefore is also liable for Albrecht's failure to procure the insurance 
requested by Harris. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) allows entry of summary judgment only "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary 
judgment has "the affiimative burden of establishing that there [are] no material issues of 
fact." Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928-29 (Utah 1993). In 
reviewing the evidence presented, the court is to "view the facts and all reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Walker 
Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1230 (Utah 1995). At the summary judgment 
stage, "a trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist." Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 
1100 (Utah 1995). "A genuine issue of material fact exists where, on the basis of the 
facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on any material issue." Ron Shepherd 
Ins. Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 655 (Utah 1994). 
It is well-settled that "entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law," and 
that, therefore, an appellate court is to "accord no deference to the trial court's resolution 
of the legal issues presented." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996). The 
court of appeals, in conducting this de novo review, was to "apply the same standard as 
that applied by the trial court." Durham, 571 P.2d at 1334. In reviewing the court of 
appeals' decision, this Court is to use the same underlying standard (as set forth in Rule 
56(c)), but is to review the decision of the court of appeals for correctness. See Collins, 
2002UT77,1fH,52P.3dl267. 
ARGUMENT 
Harris asserts two separate and independent causes of action against Defendants 
for their failure to procure insurance: one claim, grounded in tort, for negligence, and 
one claim for breach of a contract to procure insurance. It is well-established that 
liability [of an insurance agent] may be predicated either upon the theory 
that defendant is the agent of the insured and has breached a contract to 
procure a policy of insurance, or that he owes a duty to his principal to 
exercise reasonable skill, care, and diligence in securing the insurance 
requested and negligently failed to do so. 
See Sanchez v. Martinez, 653 P.2d 897, 900-01 (N.M. Ct. App. 1982). Harris has 
asserted both causes of action here, and (despite Defendants' continuing efforts to 
conflate these two claims) these claims must be treated and analyzed separately, because 
they contain slightly different elements and requirements of proof. 
The court of appeals remanded both claims for trial, and, Harris submits, this 
outcome was the correct one. This Court should affirm the determination of the court of 
appeals, and its decision to remand this case for trial, because disputed issues of material 
fact remain as to both of Harris's causes of action. Where, as here, genuine issues of fact 
remain to be decided by the jury, the district court's entry of summary judgment was 
inappropriate. This case should be remanded to the district court for trial. 
I. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN AS TO HARRIS'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
The district court's decision to enter summary judgment on Harris's negligence 
claim was erroneous, and the court of appeals correctly reversed that decision, because 
genuine issues of fact remain to be decided on that claim. To prove up his claim of 
negligence, Harris must show that Albrecht had a duty to procure insurance, that Albrecht 
breached that duty, and that Harris was justified in relying upon Albrecht's assurance that 
he would take care of the insurance request. See Harris v. Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, 
Tfl 1, 46 P.3d 241. As discussed above, there is record evidence to support Harris's claim 
that he instructed Albrecht to procure business insurance for Ken Harris Architect, that 
Albrecht agreed to take care of the request, that Albrecht, in fact, did not take care of the 
request, and that Harris was justified in assuming that he was insured. For the purposes 
of this appeal, this Court must assume these facts to be true. If these facts are true, then, 
under applicable law, Albrecht breached his duty to Harris, and, therefore, summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on Harris's negligence claim is improper. 
A. DUTY: Albrecht Had a Duty to Follow Harris's Instructions and to 
Exercise Reasonable Care in the Procurement of Insurance, and This 
Duty Attached as Soon as Harris Instructed Albrecht to Procure the 
Insurance and Albrecht Agreed 
Albrecht had a duty to follow instructions and to exercise reasonable care in the 
procurement of insurance for Harris. That duty attached as soon as Harris instructed 
Albrecht to procure insurance for his business and Albrecht agreed. The court of appeals 
correctly determined that, under the facts viewed in a light most favorable to Harris, it 
would be possible for a court to conclude, as a matter of law, that Albrecht owed a duty 
to Harris to exercise reasonable care in procuring insurance for Harris. The court of 
appeals' decision should be upheld. 
Defendants make much of an unfortunately-worded footnote in the court of 
appeals' opinion, where the court of appeals noted that "whether a . . . duty to procure a 
policy of insurance ultimately exists" is a "question[] of fact best left to the trier of fact." 
See Harris v. Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, ^29 n.6. It is, of course, well-established that 
"the question of whether a duty exists is a question of law." See AMS Salt Indus., Inc. v. 
Magnesium Corp. of Am., 942 P.2d 315, 319 (Utah 1997); see also Ferree v. State, 784 
P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) (same). However, the legal question—whether a duty 
exists—is often dependent upon one or more underlying factual questions, and this Court 
has clearly held that, if reasonable minds can differ on the underlying factual questions, 
then those questions "should be left for the jury to decide." See AMS Salt, 942 P.2d at 
319-20 (stating that "if the trial court determines that there is disputed evidence which is 
material to the relevant question of law, then the issue should be left for the jury to 
decide"); see also Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363-65 (Utah 1986) 
(determining that the legal "duty" question was dependent upon a factual issue, and that 
the underlying factual issue was for the jury). After the factfinder has decided the 
underlying factual issues, then the court can finally determine, as a matter of law, 
whether a duty exists. 
In the duty-to-procure-insurance context, as in many other duty contexts, the 
existence of a legal duty on the part of the agent is dependent upon underlying factual 
issues. The court of appeals, in essence, held that a duty arises on the part of an 
insurance agent when the client asks the agent to procure insurance and the agent agrees,, 
See Harris v. Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, ^ jl l.4 This holding is completely in accord with 
established law nationwide. 
3
 For instance, the existence of a fiduciary duty—a legal issue—is dependent upon the 
factual issue of whether a person is a fiduciary. See, e^g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. 
National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654-55 (Utah 1988); McCornick v. Queen of 
Sheba Gold Min. & Milling Co., 23 Utah 71, 77, 63 P. 820, 822 (1900). And, the 
existence of a landowner's duty to a visitor on the land—a legal issue—depends upon the 
factual issue of the status of the visitor (e.g., invitee, licensee, trespasser). See, e.g., 
Connor v. Union Fac. R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 416-19 (Utah 1998); Skerl v. Willow Creek 
Coal Co., 92 Utah 474, 482, 69 P.2d 502, 505 (1937). 
4
 The court of appeals' core holding was its pronouncement that, "[t]o establish a claim 
for failure to procure insurance, a plaintiff must prove" three elements: (1) an 
undertaking by an insurance agent to procure insurance; (2) the agent's failure to use 
reasonable diligence in attempting to place insurance and his failure to notify the client 
promptly if he has failed to obtain insurance; and (3) the agent's actions warranted an 
assumption by the client that he was properly insured. See Harris v. Albrecht, 2002 UT 
App 98, Ifll. The first of these elements deals with the agent's duty, the second deals 
with the agent's breach of that duty, and the third deals with the client's reasonable 
reliance upon the agent's assurance. Thus, the court of appeals appears to be stating that, 
in order to show that an insurance agent owes a duty of reasonable care to a client, the 
client must show "an undertaking by an insurance agent to procure insurance." 
Courts and commentators agree that an insurance agent's duty to his clients 
extends far enough to include an "obligation to deal with [the] principal in good faith and 
to carry out instructions" 16A John Alan Appleman and Jean Appleman, Insurance Law 
and Practice § 8836, at 64 (1981) (emphasis added); see 3 George J. Couch, Couch on 
Insurance § 46:28 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that "[t]he insured's agent must strictly follow 
the insured's instructions which are clear, explicit, absolute, and unqualified" (emphasis 
added)); see also, e.g., Gabrielson v. Warnemunde, 443 N.W.2d 540, 543 (Minn. 1989) 
(stating that an insurance agent's duty includes the duty "to act in good faith and follow 
instructions"). 
It follows, then, that when an insured instructs his agent to procure a particular 
kind of insurance, the agent is under a duty to procure that insurance. See Caddy v. 
Smith, 877 P.2d 667, 669 (Or. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that, "[depending on the nature of 
the instructions, [the agent's] duty may include an obligation to procure insurance"). 
Under established law, in order for the agent's duty to procure insurance to attach, all that 
must happen is (1) the insured must issue clear instructions to the agent instructing the 
agent to procure the insurance, and (2) the agent must agree to procure the requested 
insurance. See Precision Castparts Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins of Oregon, Inc., 607 P.2d 
763, 765 (Or. 1980) (stating that "[b]y promising to procure insurance, the agent incurs a 
duty to do so"); see also Southwest Auto Painting and Body Repair, Inc. v. Binsfeld, 904 
P.2d 1268, 1269 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a district court's entry of summary 
judgment, and holding that once the plaintiff had asked the agent to procure insurance 
and the agent agreed, the agent owed a duty to the plaintiff); Marshel Investments, Inc. v. 
Cohen, 634 P.2d 133, 141 (Kan Ct. App. 1981) (duty attached upon customer's request 
for "complete insurance coverage" on an oil and gas well, and upon agent's assurance 
that he would take care of the request); Bonner v. Bank of Coushatta, 445 So. 2d 84, 87 
(La. Ct. App. 1984) (duty attaches after "agreement by the insurance agent to procure 
insurance"); Lee v. Andrews, 667 P.2d 919, 920-21 (Mont. 1986) (duty attached upon 
customer's request for insurance and agent's assurance that he "would take care of it"); 
Caddy, 877 P.2d at 669 (same). Perhaps the most concise summary of this area of 
insurance/tort law was offered by the Montana Supreme Court, which opined that 
applicable law "requires [1] a client's request to procure certain insurance, followed by 
[2] an agent fs commitment to do the same, [in order] to put the agent under a 'duty' to 
procurer R.H. Grover, Inc. v. Flynn Ins. Co., 777 P.2d 338, 341 (Mont. 1989) (citing 
Andrews, 667 P.2d at 919) (emphasis added). The court of appeals' holding in this case5 
was therefore entirely in keeping with the established position of courts nationwide.6 
5
 It is noteworthy that Defendants do not question—either in their Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari or in their opening brief—the propriety of the court of appeals' core holding 
(Paragraph 11 of the opinion). The only "questions presented" for review by this Court, 
according to Defendants, are whether the court of appeals' unfortunately-worded 
statements in footnote 6 of its opinion were erroneous. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, at 1 (setting forth questions presented); Brief of Appellants, at 1 (setting forth 
issues on appeal). In short, Defendants have not challenged, and do not ask this Court to 
review, the court of appeals' core holding, in Paragraph 11 of its opinion, regarding the 
elements that must be shown in order to prove up a claim for failure to procure insurance. 
6
 Defendants attempt to conflate Harris's tort claim with his contract claim by arguing 
that "the duty to procure insurance sounding in tort does not arise until the agent has 
contracted to procure the policy." See Aplts.' Br., at 44. In essence, Defendants 
maintain that, in order for a tort duty of reasonable care to exist, all of the elements of a 
contract to procure insurance must already exist. Id. Defendants' position is simply not 
supported by law or logic. First, Defendants' position runs contrary to the case law and 
Under the court of appeals' holding (and under established law nationwide), the 
legal question regarding whether an insurance agent owes a^tort duty to one of his 
customers is dependent upon two underlying factual issues: (1) did the customer instruct 
the agent to procure insurance; and (2) did the agent agree to procure the insurance. If 
reasonable minds can differ on the underlying factual issues, then the court cannot, on 
summary judgment, determine as a matter of law whether a duty exists. That inquiry 
must await determination, by the factfinder, of the underlying unresolved factual issues. 
authorities cited immediately above. Second, the cases and authorities Defendants cite do 
not support Defendants' position—none of the cited authorities stands for the proposition 
that, in order for a tort duty to arise, each and every element of a valid contract of 
insurance must be shown. The Johnson case deals with the issue only in dicta, and in any 
event involved a situation where it was undisputed that the plaintiff did not even make a 
request that insurance be procured. See Johnson v. George Tenuta & Co., 185 S.E.2d 
732, 736 (N.C. Ct. App. 1972). The 50-year-old French Board case contains only a 
cursory treatment of the issue, and actually came out in favor of the client. See Bank of 
French Board v. Bryan, 83 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. 1954). And the Stockberger case, in 
devoting most of its energies to the claimant's breach of contract claim (rather than to the 
tort claim), states that an agent will be held to the reasonable care standard, and will be 
liable for breaching obligations ro which he agreed. See Stockberger v. Meridian Mut. 
Ins. Co., 395 N.E.2d 1272, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). To the extent that these cases and 
authorities stand for the unremarkable proposition that, in order for a tort duty to arise, 
there must be some level of assent by the agent that he will procure the requested 
insurance, these cases are not contrary to the cases and authorities cited by Harris above, 
see, e.g., R.H. Grover, 777 P.2d at 341 (stating that the agent must commit to procure the 
insurance), and are not contrary to the court of appeals core holding, see Harris v. 
Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, f 11 (stating that there must be "an undertaking or agreement 
by an insurance agent to procure insurance"). In short, in order for a tort duty of 
reasonable care to arise, it is not necessary to prove each element of a contract to procure 
insurance. This is so because the agent can comply with the tort duty in ways (i.e., 
following up with the client to obtain additional necessary information or to tell him that 
the insurance has not been procured) other than actually procuring the insurance, while 
compliance with a conCactual duty, by contrast, requires that the insurance policy 
actually be procured. 
The court of appeals resolved this situation in the appropriate and proper manner 
by deferring decision on the duty issue until after the factfinder has decided the 
underlying factual issues. In this case, Harris maintains that he instructed Albrecht to 
procure insurance for his business, and that Albrecht agreed. See R. at 330. Albrecht 
denies that Harris ever gave such an instruction, and denies that he ever agreed. See 
Brief of Appellants, at 7. This is a classic factual dispute. Until this factual dispute is 
decided, no court (whether the district court, court of appeals, or this Court) can decide 
the overarching legal issue regarding the existence of a duty. At the summary judgment 
stage, all courts must view the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party 
(here, Harris), and must assume that Harris did in fact instruct Albrecht to procure 
insurance, and must assume that Albrecht agreed. Once the court makes these 
assumptions, it becomes evident that summary judgment cannot be entered in favor of 
Defendants on the duty issue, because it is possible, if the factual questions come out 
Harris's way, for Albrecht to have had a duty to Harris. The court of appeals' resolution 
of this claim was proper, and should be affirmed. 
7
 Defendants argue that there are no underlying issues of fact to be decided because, for 
summary judgment purposes, Defendants must assume that the facts as recounted by 
Harris are true. Defendants assert that only a legal issue remains, namely, "whether, 
based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht had a duty . . . to procure insurance." 
See Aplts.' Br., at 19. The court of appeals in essence decided (without explicitly saying 
so) that, based on the facts as alleged by Harris, Albrecht did have a duty to exercise 
reasonable care in the procurement of insurance, but that final determination of that legal 
question would have to await the factfinder's resolution of the underlying factual dispute. 
This determination was correct. 
B. BREACH: Albrecht's Duty Required Him Either to Procure The 
Insurance or to Notify Harris that the Insurance Could Not Be 
Procured 
While the question regarding the existence of a duty is a question of law, questions 
related to breach of a duty are questions of fact for the jury, and "cannot be appropriately 
decided in summary judgment." Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 575 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Accordingly, negligence/breach claims are almost never 
appropriate for resolution on summary judgment. See Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., Inc., 821 
P.2d 458, 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (stating that "summary judgment is generally 
improper in the issue of negligence and only in clear-cut cases, with the exercise of great 
caution, should a court take the issue of negligence from the province of the jury"). The 
issue of negligence as a whole is a question of fact for the jury, see Dwiggins v. Morgan 
Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991), and it is only when the facts are undisputed and 
"only one conclusion can be drawn from them" that such issues are appropriately decided 
on summary judgment," Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). 
Questions related to the breach of an insurance agent's duty, once that duty 
attaches, are questions of fact governed by the reasonable care standard. An insurance 
agent who commits to procure insurance has the duty to "exercise reasonable skill, care, 
and diligence in securing the insurance requested." Sanchez, 653 P.2d at 900-01; see also 
Binsfeld, 904 P.2d at 1270-71; Marshel Investments, 634 P.2d at 141; Caddy, 877 P.2d at 
669. It is important to emphasize that this "reasonable care" standard does not require, in 
every case, that the agent actually procure insurance for the client. 
Rather, the standard requires the agent to exercise reasonable care in his efforts to 
procure the insurance requested. This standard of reasonable care requires the agent to 
either (1) actually procure the insurance, or (2) follow-up with the client, if necessary, to 
obtain additional information that may be necessary or to tell the client that the insurance 
cannot be procured. Courts and commentators across the country are in full agreement 
on this score. See, e.g., Bayly, Martin & Fay, Inc. v. Pete's Satire, Inc., 739 P.2d 239, 
243 (Colo. 1987) (stating that "an insurance broker or agent who agrees to obtain a 
particular form of insurance coverage for the person seeking such insurance has a legal 
duty to obtain such coverage or to notify the person of his failure to do so"); Sanchez, 
653 P.2d at 901 (stating that the duty assumed by an insurance agent includes the duty to 
either procure the insurance or, alternatively, to "seasonably notify the principal that [the 
agent] is unable to [procure the insurance] in order that the principal may obtain 
insurance elsewhere"); see also 3 George J. Couch, Couch on Insurance § 25:47, at 371-
73 (2d rev. ed. 1984) (stating that an insurance agent "is liable to the insured for loss if he 
fails to give prompt notice of his refusal to procure insurance; or fails to give immediate 
notice, or notice within a reasonable time, of his inability to procure insurance, unless the 
insured knows of that fact"). 
It should be explicitly noted here that the scope of the agent's duty is not 
diminished at all by any failure of the insured to investigate whether the agent has 
performed his duty. Any duty to follow-up is the agent's, not the insured's. It is well-
settled that "[t]he liability of the agent for harm caused the insured is not affected by the 
fact that the insured took no steps to investigate to see that his or her instructions had 
been followed, there being no suspicious circumstances, since, in the absence of any 
element of knowledge, the insured has a right to rely upon a presumed obedience to his or 
her instructions upon the part of his or her skilled agent." See 3 George J. Couch, Couch 
on Insurance § 46:28 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Black v. Illinois Fair 
Plan Ass'n, 409 N.E.2d 549 (111. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that "in the instant case the 
defendant was the agent of the plaintiffs in procuring the insurance policy and it cannot 
avoid liability because of an alleged failure on the part of plaintiffs to ascertain whether 
the agent has faithfully performed the duty for which he was employed" (citation 
omitted)); Shapiro v. Amalgamated Trust and Savings Bank, 283 111. App. 243, 247 
(1935) (same); Industrial Dev. Assocs. v. F.T.P., Inc., 591 A.2d 682, 684 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1991) (stating that where an agent "took no steps whatsoever to follow-up," 
the agent could be said to have "failed to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in 
the execution of his commission"), affd, 602 A.2d 733 (N.J. 1992); Sanchez, 653 P.2d at 
899 (holding that, even where customer did not follow up with the agent for twenty (20) 
years, the agent was nonetheless liable for failure to procure insurance); Mets Donuts, 
Inc. v. Dairvland Ins. Co., 560 N.Y.S.2d 790, 791 (App. Div. 1990) (stating that "[i]n the 
absence of any showing that an insured is aware of the discrepancy between the coverage 
it claims to have requested and that actually obtained by the insurance agent, an insured 
has a right to rely upon the agent's presumed obedience to his or her instructions"). 
Defendants devote several pages of their brief arguing that Albrecht could not 
possibly have procured insurance for Harris's business because Harris did not 
communicate to Albrecht, during the parties' "very short conversation," many intricate 
and allegedly necessary details about the requested insurance. See Brief of Appellants, at 
12-15, 29-33. Defendants ignore both the law regarding the reasonable care standard as 
o 
well as the reality of the insurance procurement process. 
First, the reasonable care standard does not require Albrecht to actually procure 
the requested insurance if he truly cannot do so.9 The standard does, however, require 
him to, at a minimum, communicate with Harris and inform him either that the insurance 
cannot be procured, or that further information is needed. See Gulf-Tex Brokerage, Inc. 
v. McDade & Assocs., 433 F. Supp. 1015, 1018-19 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (stating that an 
insurance agent's duty includes the "duty to keep the plaintiff informed as to the progress 
of the request"). An agent cannot simply "forg[e]t about the insurance" and do nothing to 
contact the insured and keep him apprised of the status of the request. See Fleetwood 
o 
Defendants also muddle the distinction between duty (a question of law) and breach (a 
question of fact). Whether an agent's duty includes the specific obligation to follow-up 
with the client is an issue related to breach, not to duty. "An insurance agent's duty is to 
exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence in procuring insurance for the insured." See 
Binsfeld, 904 P.2d at 1271. Whether the agent breached that duty by taking or failing to 
take some specific action (such as, for instance, failing to follow up with the client) is a 
breach issue, and is a question of fact. Id. 
9
 Defendants' argument that "[i]f no insurance could have been obtained, then a duty to 
procure insurance could not have been breached" is simply incorrect. See Aplts.' Br., at 
31. Defendants cite Haggans v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 803 So. 2d 1249 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 2002), for the proposition, but that case is completely inapposite. In that case, it 
truly was impossible for the agent to procure insurance—the evidence in the record was 
that no insurance carrier writing insurance in the entire state of Mississippi would provide 
the precise type of coverage (contents coverage for an unoccupied building) desired 
there. See Haggans, 803 So. 2d at 1252. In this case, by contrast, it is certainly possible 
to obtain business insurance, at least where the agent fulfills his duty to the client to 
follow-up and obtain the requisite information. And, in any event, as the authorities cited 
above in text show, the reasonable care standard requires, at a minimum, that an agent 
contact the insured to inform him when insurance cannot be procured as promised. 
Motors. Inc. v. John F. James & Sons, Inc., 237 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (Sup. Ct. 1963). If an 
agent truly cannot procure the requested insurance, the agent must at least notify the 
client that the insurance cannot be procured, or contact the client to obtain whatever 
additional information is necessary to procure the insurance. 
Second, Defendants ignore the realities of the situation. Most insureds, including 
Harris, are laypersons when it comes to the intricacies of the insurance industry. They 
cannot be expected to know the specific types of insurance available, and the specific 
types of information required by insurance companies before a policy can issue. See, 
e.g., Binsfeld, 904 P.2d at 1269. It is for this precise reason that laypersons hire 
insurance agents—to guide them through the insurance thicket. See Hamacher v. Tumy, 
352 P.2d 493, 497 (Or. 1960) (stating that "[t]he insurance broker holds himself out as an 
expert in his field and in*dealing with his clients ordinarily he invites them to rely upon 
his expertise in procuring the insurance which best fits their requirements"). The best 
evidence of the complexity of insurance applications is demonstrated by the addendum to 
Defendants' brief. See Aplts.' Br., at Exhibit C (copy of insurance application). It is 
difficult to imagine how any layperson could be expected to know, without being told by 
the insurance agent hired for that purpose, that these specific types of information are 
required. To turn the burden to follow-up around, and impose it upon laypersons, would 
be to impose a large and undue burden upon potential lay insureds to educate themselves 
with respect to each type of insurance coverage available, each piece of information 
required, etc.10 
It makes the most sense, both from a legal and a policy standpoint, to impose the 
duty to follow-up on the agent, at least once the insured has expressly instructed the agent 
to procure the insurance and the agent has agreed. An insurance agent can easily protect 
himself from liability by refusing to promise to procure insurance until such time as, for 
instance, a firm instruction is issued, or additional information is provided.11 It seems but 
a small burden to ask insurance agents to be more precise in the language they use in 
conversations with insureds and potential insureds. The duty to follow-up is rightly 
placed on the agent, at least after the agent expressly agrees to take care of the request. 
Perhaps the most persuasive evidence in this case that the duty to follow up should 
rightly be (and in fact is) placed on the agent is Albrecht's deposition testimony. 
Albrecht himself stated that an insurance agent, out of "common-sense," has an 
10
 To to impose the burden upon insureds to educate themselves and to follow up on their 
own, without prodding, to provide each piece of information required to place a policy, 
would make a large part of an insurance agent's job, as presently constituted, obsolete. 
Laypersons hire insurance agents for the precise purpose of having the agent guide the 
layperson through the insurance application process. Indeed, Albrecht acknowledges 
that, in addition to selling insurance policies themselves, agents also sell "service" to 
their clients. See R. at 290. 
11
 For instance, if Albrecht had said, "Ken, I'd love to insure your business, but I can't 
until I have some additional information," Albrecht would likely have protected himself 
from liability because Harris would have known that no policy would or could yet issue. 
However, Albrecht did not say that; rather, he expressly told Harris that he would take 
care of his request. In this instance, according to both law and policy, the ball is in the 
agent's court to follow-up and to inform Harris that additional information is required, or 
that the insurance cannot be procured, etc. 
"obligation" to follow-up with an insured in the event coverage could not be issued as 
requested. Albrecht engaged in the following exchange with counsel: 
Q: . . . . If at any time from that point on—from the point that he says "I 
want the insurance. I want State Farm to insure me in this situation," 
and this process starts, you agree, do you not, that for the same 
common-sense reasons you discussed previously, that if any time the 
process stops—the verbal binder ends, there isn }t sufficient 
information given to finish out the—for whatever reason the process 
ceases, you have an obligation, as the agent, to contact that 
individual and say, "Hey, I don't want you to be under the 
misunderstanding that you have coverage here. You don't. There 
are things we need to do"? That's true, isn't it, for the same 
common-sense reasons we talked about before? 
A: We would either make a phone call. If we were unable to reach 
them on the phone, we would send a letter. We would— 
Q: That's a "Yes"? 
A: —we would contact them either by phone or by letter, yes. 
Q: So there are no misunderstandings, correct? 
A: So there's no misunderstandings, so it's not something they thought 
was covered is—not covered was covered. 
Q: And that protects you and it protects them? 
A: Protects both parties. 
Q: And if you don't do that, then you expose both your client to a 
potential loss without coverage and it exposes you to problems, 
correct? 
A: Correct. 
See R. at 287 (emphasis added). 
Simply put, the scope of an insurance agent's tort duties to an insured are to 
exercise reasonable care in the procurement of insurance. This duty to exercise 
reasonable care includes—even according to Albrecht himself—the duty to follow up 
with the insured to make sure that either the coverage is in place or to inform the insured 
that it is not in place. Albrecht failed to meet this standard, because, for whatever reason, 
he did absolutely nothing by way of complying with Harris's instructions. He did not 
visit Harris's business. He did not call Harris and ask for additional information. He did 
not call Harris and inform him that the policy could not be procured. And he did not 
procure the requested insurance. This is a breach of duty. An agent cannot simply forget 
about an insured's request, and then blame the insured when things go awry because the 
insured did not provide pieces of information about which the insured had no way of 
even knowing. See Fleetwood Motors, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 670. 
As noted above, issues related to breach of duty are questions of fact. See 
Schreiter, 871 P.2d at 575. At a minimum, questions of fact remain on the issues related 
to Albrecht's breach of duty. The court of appeals correctly determined that summary 
judgment on these issues was improper. 
C. REASONABLE RELIANCE: Harris Reasonably Relied Upon 
Albrecht's Assurance That He Would Take Care of the Insurance 
Request 
The final element of the test set forth by the court of appeals is whether "the 
agent's actions warranted an assumption by the client that he was properly insured." See 
Harris v. Albrecht, 2002 UT App 98, ^ [1 1. The court of appeals properly concluded that it 
was inappropriate for an appellate court "to make such a determination, which we believe 
is a proper question for the trier of fact." Id. at ^ [28 n.5. 
This Court has long held that "[t]he issue of actual reliance and the reasonableness 
of the reliance is, of course, for the jury to determine." See Berkeley Bank for Co'ops v. 
Mdbos, 607 P.2d 798. 801 (Utah 1980); see also Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl 896 P.2d 
644, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (stating that the question of reasonable reliance "is one of 
fact to be determined at trial"). As with any question of fact, questions of reasonable 
reliance must be given to the jury unless reasonable minds cannot differ on the reliance 
issue based on the evidence presented. 
In this case, the record is replete with evidence that Harris's reliance upon 
Albrecht's assurance was reasonable. During the eight-year period over which the two 
men conducted business, Harris and Albrecht had developed a personalized business 
relationship. In the beginning, Albrecht was highly recommended to Harris as a qualified 
and competent insurance agent with a good reputation in the community. See R. at 286, 
354-55. Over time, Harris purchased automobile insurance from Albrecht for as many as 
4 or 5 vehicles, and, in addition, asked Albrecht to procure other types of insurance for 
him, including homeowners' insurance, boat insurance, R.V. insurance, and a liability 
umbrella policy. Id. at 285, 333, 341, 354-55. Harris did not ask for insurance quotes 
from other agents, because Albrecht had come so highly recommended, and because 
Albrecht always treated Harris well. Id. at 341. Indeed, over the years Harris came to 
have great confidence in Albrecht, and came to believe that Albrecht would obtain for 
him a good product at a reasonable price. Id. at 329. 
The relationship between Harris and Albrecht was almost exclusively a telephonic 
one, and the two men met only rarely in person. Id. at 274, 285-86, 331. Over the years, 
the two men talked on the telephone approximately 4-6 times per year. Id. at 279, 325. 
The way the relationship worked was that Harris would telephone Albrecht when Harris 
needed to make some type of change in his insurance coverage—e.g., add an automobile, 
home, or boat to the policy, add the name of a child to the policy, etc.—and would ask 
Albrecht to effect the requested change. Id. at 331. Typically, Harris, relying on 
Albrecht's knowledge and expertise, would grant Albrecht great latitude in filling in the 
particulars of the requested insurance coverage. Id. at ^ 339. This was because, over 
the years, Harris had developed a great deal of trust and confidence in Albrecht because 
every time he asked Albrecht to make a change in coverage, Albrecht took care of the 
request competently. Id. at 326, 328, 331. Albrecht confirmed that Harris relied on 
Albrecht's expertise, and that Harris and Harris's family members trusted him to take 
care of their insurance needs, id. at 271, 273, and that based upon the parties' long-
standing relationship, Harris was reasonably justified in relying upon Albrecht to obtain 
coverage that Harris asked Albrecht to procure, id. 
Typically, during the telephone conversations, the two men would not discuss the 
particulars of the requested coverage. Id. at 337. As it worked, Harris would call 
Albrecht, tell him, for instance, what type of car he wanted to add, and Albrecht would 
place the coverage. Id. Albrecht would then mail to Harris any documents he needed to 
have, such as, for instance, billings and applications, and Harris's practice was that he did 
not typically review the mailings he received from Albrecht, again relying on the 
expertise and competence of his highly recommended and experienced agent. Id. at 343. 
Over the years, Albrecht did such a fine job for Harris in procuring the coverages 
requested—even in the absence of any detailed discussions regarding the particulars of 
coverage—that Harris never had to even follow-up with Albrecht to make sure that the 
coverages had been procured. Id. at 273, 326, 328. 
In the face of this evidence, the question of reasonable reliance should be 
submitted to the jury. It must be remembered that, under the law, it is the agent's duty— 
not the client's—to follow up on the insurance request if additional information is 
required, and "the insured has a right to rely upon a presumed obedience to his or her 
instructions upon the part of his or her skilled agent." See 3 George J. Couch, Couch on 
Insurance § 46:28 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis added); see generally supra Part LB. Even 
Albrecht agrees, testifying that Harris would be reasonably justified in relying upon 
Albrecht to obtain coverage that Harris asked Albrecht to procure. See R. at 271, 273. It 
would be entirely reasonable for a jury to conclude that, based upon the eight-year course 
of dealing between Harris and Albrecht, Harris reasonably relied upon Albrecht's 
assurance that he would take care of the insurance request. A reasonable jury could 
conclude that Albrecht's actions warranted an assumption by Harris that he was properly 
insured. 
In sum, then, Harris has presented evidence on all three elements of his negligence 
claim sufficient to warrant sending that claim to the jury. The district court improperly 
denied Harris his chance to present his case to the jury. The court of appeals restored that 
right, and this Court should affirm the determination of the court of appeals. 
II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAIN AS TO HARRIS'S 
CLAIM FOR BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PROCURE INSURANCE 
The district court's decision to enter summary judgment on Harris's breach of 
contract claim was erroneous, and the court of appeals correctly reversed that decision, 
because genuine issues of fact remain to be decided on that claim. The record contains 
ample evidence that the parties came to an oral agreement, under which Albrecht 
committed to procure business insurance for Harris's business, and that Albrecht 
breached that agreement by failing to procure the requested insurance. Because genuine 
issues of material fact remain to be decided on this claim, summary judgment is 
improper. 
A. Disputed Questions Related to Formation and Breach of a Contract 
Are Questions of Fact to Be Decided by the Jury 
As an initial matter, it must be noted that questions regarding whether an oral 
contract was formed, and whether such a contract, if formed, was breached, are questions 
of fact that are to be decided by the factfinder. This Court has stated that "where the 
existence of a contract is the point in issue and the evidence is conflicting or admits of 
more than one inference, it is for the jury to determine whether the contract did in fact 
exist." O'Hara v. Hall 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981) (emphasis added). The Court 
went on to state that u[w]hether the parties intended to enter [into] a binding contract is 
. . . an issue of fact" because "the question of intent generally is one to be determined by 
the trier of fact." Id. The Court reversed a legal judgment by the district court, and 
remanded the case so that the trier of fact could decide whether or not a valid contract 
had been formed by the parties. Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court's formulation of these principles in O'Hara comports 
with other states' pronouncements. See, e^g,, Howarth v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 
This principle was reiterated by the court of appeals in 1993, when the court, citing 
O'Hara, stated that "[t]he issue of whether a contract exists may present both questions of 
law and fact, depending upon the nature of the claims raised." See Cal Wadsworth 
Constr. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The court 
noted that its standard of review "turns on whether the claim is one of fact or law, 
because a ruling on whether a contract exists may embody several subsidiary rulings." 
Id. This Court reviewed the court of appeals' opinion in Wadsworth, and affirmed it in 
all respects, noting along the way that the subsidiary rulings contained in the 
determination as to whether a contract exists—e.g., whether an offer was accepted—were 
indeed questions of fact. See Cal Wadsworth Constr v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 
1372, 1378 (Utah 1995). Since Wadsworth, Utah's appellate courts have reaffirmed this 
principle. See, e ^ , Brighton Corp. v. Ward, 2001 UT App 236, [^14, 31 P.3d 594; 
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 257 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), cert, denied, 
953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1997). 
The cases cited by Defendants are not to the contrary. Indeed, the principal case 
relied upon by Petitioners, Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999 UT 100, f 17, 
989 P.2d 1077, cites to O'Hara with approval, and holds that "the issue of whether a 
contract exists may present questions of both law and fact" and that "[w]hether a contract 
has been formed is ultimately a conclusion of law, but that ordinarily depends on the 
resolution of subsidiary issues of fact." Id. (citing O'Hara). The other cases cited by 
Petitioners involve situations where the operative facts were not in dispute—what was in 
dispute was the legal effect of those undisputed facts. See Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. 
Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 582-84 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 
427-28 (Utah 1961). In those situations, the determination as to whether a contract exists 
is a pure question of law. 
In the situation presented by this case, by contrast, the underlying "subsidiary" issues 
of fact are hotly in dispute. Thus, in order for any court to decide, as a matter of law, 
whether a contract of insurance existed between Harris and Albrecht, the factfinder must 
first decide, as a matter of fact, whether Albrecht ever agreed to procure insurance. The 
parties' testimony is conflicting on that point, and that factual conflict must be 
adjudicated by the factfinder before any determination can be made with respect to the 
existence of a contract. 
596 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Alaska 1979) (reversing entry of directed verdict, and stating that 
"[w]here the existence of an oral contract and the terms thereof are contested and the 
evidence is conflicting, it is for the trier of fact to determine whether the contract did in 
fact exist and, if so, the terms of such contract"); cf, Roeske v. Diefenbach, 249 N.W.2d 
555, 558 (Wis. 1977) (stating that "[t]he existence of an oral contract of insurance is a 
question of fact"). Indeed, the Alaska Supreme Court has explained that 
[o]ral contracts are often, by their very nature, dependent upon an 
understanding of the surrounding circumstances, the intent of the parties, 
and the credibility of witnesses. If a dispute exists with respect to the terms 
of the oral contract, then summary judgment is not appropriate. Instead, 
the trier of fact in a trial setting should make the final determination with 
respect to the existence of the contractual agreement. 
Howarth v. First Nat'l Bank of Anchorage, 540 P.2d 486, 490 (Alaska 1975) (emphasis 
added). 
It is also beyond dispute that questions related to the breach of any contract, 
whether oral or written, are questions of fact for the jury's determination. See Mackey v. 
Cannon, 2000 UT App 36, \\5 & n.l, 996 P.2d 1081 (stating that "[w]hether a party has 
materially breached a contract is generally a question of fact for the fact finder"). 
Thus, so long as "any credible evidence," see Diefenbach, 255 N.W.2d at 558, 
viewed in the light most favorable to Harris, supports Harris's contention that an oral 
contract exists and was breached, then summary judgment is inappropriate and the 
question should go to the jury. 
B. Credible Evidence Exists Supporting Each of the Elements of Harris's 
Claim For Breach of a Contract to Procure Insurance 
1. A claim for breach of a contract to procure insurance is different 
from a claim for breach of a contract of insurance. 
Certainly, the record contains sufficient evidence supporting Harris's breach of 
contract claim to preclude summary judgment on that count. That record evidence is 
canvassed below. As an initial matter, however, it must first be pointed out that Harris's 
claim is for breach of a contract to procure insurance—not breach of a contract of 
insurance. See R. at 4-5. This distinction is crucial, because, although the elements of 
this claim are identical to the elements of a claim for breach of a contract of insurance, 
the standards of proof that a plaintiff must meet are considerably more relaxed in the 
context of a claim for breach of a contract to procure insurance. 
Utah's appellate courts have not yet had an opportunity to address these issues. 
But some of Utah's sister states have thoroughly discussed the distinctions between a 
contract to procure insurance and a contract of insurance. One of the cases to most fully 
discuss the differences is Hamacher v. Tumy, 352 P.2d 493 (Or. 1960). In that case, the 
court addressed the following specific question: "Must the promisee of a contract to 
procure insurance prove all of the essentials of a contract of insurance with the same 
specificity that is required of a promisee asserting the existence of a contract of 
insurance?" Id. at 497. The court went on to answer the question in the negative. In so 
doing, the court stated that 
[w]here a person seeks to enter into a contract of insurance with an 
insurance company or its agent it is understood that the negotiations will 
not ripen into a contract until the parties arrive at an agreement as to all of 
the elements which are essential to an insurance contract, including the 
subject matter to be covered, the risk insured against, the amount of the 
indemnity, the duration of the coverage, and the premium. In entering into 
a contract to procure insurance, obviously the owner is seeking the same 
ultimate objective, that is, a contract of insurance, but the performance for 
which he bargains is the services of the insurance agent in obtaining the 
best possible terms consistent with the owner's insurance needs. Such a 
contract could arise even though the agent was given the authority to 
ascertain some of the facts essential to the creation of the ultimate contract 
of insurance, such as the appraised value of the property to be covered or 
the most advantageous premium. . . . Obviously, liability for failure to 
procure insurance could not arise unless the agent had sufficiently definite 
directions from his principal to enable him to consummate the final 
insurance contract [However,] an express agreement is not 
necessary; the scope of the risk, the subject matter to be covered, the 
duration of the insurance, and other elements can be found by implication. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court also emphasized that another reason for relaxing the 
standards of proof in the "contract-to-procure" context is that "[t]he insurance broker 
holds himself out as an expert m his field and in dealing with his clients ordinarily he 
invites them to rely upon his expertise in procuring the insurance which best fits their 
requirements." Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that the trial court had erred by 
ruling that the plaintiff had to prove the elements of the contract to procure insurance 
with the same specificity as in a "contract-of-insurance" case, and reversed the decision 
of the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 502. 
A great many other courts around the country have addressed similar issues and 
reached the same conclusions—that a contract to procure insurance is not the same thing 
as a contract of insurance, and that the former can be proven through more relaxed 
standards of proof than can the latter. See, e.g., Bulla v. Donahue, 366 N.E.2d 233, 236 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1977) (stating that uan agreement to procure insurance may arise even 
though the agent is given authority to ascertain some of the facts essential to the creation 
of the ultimate contract of insurance" and that "[t]he terms and conditions of the proposed 
policy need only be sufficiently definite to enable the agent or broker to procure a policy 
consistent with the applicant's insurance needs"); Marshel Investments, 634 P.2d at 142 
(stating that "less strict proof is required for an oral agreement to procure insurance than 
for a contract of insurance" because, "[a]fter all, in cases such as this, the terms of the 
contract of insurance and its cost are within the field of expertise of the agent or broker 
and it is for this expertise that the agent or broker is sought out"); Rena, Inc. v T.W. 
Brien, Underwriters, 708 A.2d 747, 760 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (stating that 
"[t]he terms of the contract to procure the insurance, and scope of the risk and subject 
matter to be covered may be found by implication" (citations omitted)); Olvera v. Charles 
Z. Flack Agency, Inc.. 415 S.E.2d 760, 762 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that in the 
context of an agreement to procure insurance, "[a] 'bare acknowledgement' of a contract 
to protect the insured against casualty of a specified kind is enough, even if the parties' 
communications have not settled all the terms of the contemplated contract of insurance" 
(citations omitted)).13 
Indeed, one scholar has stated that, although "several of the older cases held that the 
duty to procure insurance could not arise unless the parties reached a definite agreement 
as to all the terms of the proposed policy," "it is now generally held that the terms and 
conditions of the proposed policy need only be sufficiently definite to enable the broker 
to procure a policy consistent with the applicant's insurance needs." Thomas R. 
Trenkner, J.D., Liability of Insurance Broker or Agent to Insured for Failure to Procure 
Insurance, 64 A.L.R. 3d 398, 406-07 (1975). 
Thus, Harris need not prove the elements of the parties' contract to procure 
insurance with the same degree of specificity as is required in the context of insurance 
contracts themselves. 
2. Harris can prove each of the necessary elements of a contract to 
procure insurance. 
Harris can prove all of the necessary elements of a contract to procure insurance. 
In this case, the evidence falls into two categories. First, the parties, in their 1997 
conversation, agreed on certain things. Second, the parties' course of dealing, over the 
eight-year period during which Albrecht served as Harris's insurance agent, provides 
evidence from which this Court can imply the remaining necessary terms of the 
agreement with sufficient specificity. 
From the parties' conversation in the summer of 1997, it is clear that Harris 
offered to enter into a contract to procure insurance, and that Albrecht accepted that offer. 
See R. at 330. The basic contractual requirements of offer and acceptance can be easily 
proven through the plain terms of the parties' 1997 conversation. Indeed, Defendants 
have never taken the position, that (if the conversation occurred) there was no valid offer 
and acceptance.14 
Also, at no point during this litigation have Defendants mounted any argument based on 
a lack of consideration. It is well-settled that "payment of a premium is not necessary to 
the validity of a contract to procure insurance and that an agreement to accept a policy if 
issued is sufficient consideration since it carries with it the implied promise to pay 
whatever premium would be due thereon." Duncanson v. Service First, Inc., 157 So. 2d 
696, 699 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); see also Boone v. Lowrv, 657 P.2d 64, 71 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1983). 
Moreover, from the parties' 1997 conversation, it is also clear that at least some of 
the particular terms of the contract to procure insurance were adverted to. For instance, it 
was clear that the subject of the insurance was business insurance coverage on Harris's 
architect offices, and that the risk or peril insured against would include fire. Id. 
Defendants, however, have not focused their arguments on either lack of offer and 
acceptance, or on failure to prove that the requested insurance was business coverage for 
Harris's offices. Rather, Defendants have chosen to focus their argument on another 
ground, arguing that, even assuming that there was a valid offer and acceptance including 
some of the terms of a contract to procure insurance, some of the other allegedly essential 
terms of the offered and accepted contract were not sufficiently definite to form an 
enforceable contract. Essentially, Defendants have taken the position that a simple 
request for full coverage against loss to a commercial business is insufficient to create a 
contract of insurance. See R. at 192-201; see also Aplts.' Br., at 22-23, 29. While this 
may or may not be true, it is irrelevant, because such a request, if accepted, is clearly 
sufficient to form the basis for a contract to procure insurance, and numerous courts 
have so held. See, e.g., Marshel Investments, 634 P.2d at 135-36 (holding that a valid 
contract to procure insurance existed where the plaintiff asked the agent for "complete 
insurance coverage" on an oil and gas well and to "[t]ake care of me . . . . I need 
complete coverage"); Andrews, 667 P.2d at 920 (holding that a valid contract to procuie 
insurance existed where the plaintiff told the agent that he needed insurance on his car 
and the agent replied that he "would take care of it"); cf Caddy, 877 P.2d at 669 (holding 
that an agent was liable to the plaintiff where the plaintiff asked the agent for insurance to 
cover "any liability" for those "working on the job" and the agent replied that he "would 
take care of it").15 This is because the terms of an agreement to procure insurance may be 
implied into the parties' contract from other sources, such as the parties' past course of 
dealing, and/or the agent's expertise, see Marshel Investments, 634 P.2d at 142; 
Hamacher, 352 P.2d at 498, and because the terms of an oral contract to procure 
insurance "need only be sufficiently definite to enable the agent or broker to procure a 
policy consistent with the applicant's insurance needs," Lakeview Farms, Inc. v. Patten, 
640 N.E.2d 1092, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted)). 
In this case, Harris and Albrecht had developed a personalized business 
relationship over the eight-year period during which the two men conducted business. 
Indeed, over the years Harris came to have great confidence in Albrecht, and came to 
believe that Albrecht would obtain for him a good product at a reasonable price. Id. at 
329. As the relationship progressed, Harris, relying on Albrecht's knowledge and 
expertise, would grant Albrecht great latitude in filling in the particulars of the requested 
insurance coverage. Id. at 339. This was because, over the years, Harris had developed a 
Other courts have held that a request for "full coverage" is insufficient to trigger a 
contract to procure insurance. See,e.g., Furtak v. Moffett, 671 N.E.2d 827, 830 (111. Ct. 
App. 1996); Boston Camping Dist. Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 282 N.E.2d 374, 
376 (Mass. 1972); Small v. King, 915 P.2d 1192, 1194 (Wyo. 1994). Harris submits that 
these cases are wrongly decided. However, most of those cases may be distinguishable in 
any event, because, in most of those cases, the customer did not narrow his request to 
"full coverage" in one particular area of insurance, such as oil and gas, automobile, etc., 
as did the customers in Marshel and Andrews. Rather, in the other cases, the customer 
stated that "he wanted insurance coverage from A to Z, second to none." See Boston 
Camping, 282 N.E.2d at 376. In this case, however, Harris's request was clearly limited 
to business insurance, making most of the other cases distinguishable. 
great deal of trust and confidence in Albrecht because every time he asked Albrecht to 
make a change in coverage, Albrecht took care of the request competently. Id. at 326, 
328, 331. Albrecht confirmed that Harris relied on Albrecht's expertise, and that Harris 
and Harris's family members trusted him to take care of their insurance needs, id. at 271, 
273, and that based upon the parties' long-standing relationship, Harris was reasonably 
justified in relying upon Albrecht to obtain coverage that Harris asked Albrecht to 
procure, id. Over the years, Albrecht did such a fine job for Harris in procuring the 
coverages requested—even in the absence of any detailed discussions regarding the 
particulars of coverage—that Harris never had to even follow-up with Albrecht to make 
sure that the coverages had been procured. Id. at 273, 326, 328. 
From this course of dealing, it is clear that Harris and Albrecht had a relationship 
in which Harris was relying, to a large degree, on the expertise of Aibrecht. Rather than 
discuss with Albrecht particular elements of the coverage, Harris would trust Albrecht, as 
an experienced agent, to obtain for him the best possible product at the most reasonable 
price. The parties' 1997 conversation was typical of the prior conversations. Harris 
telephoned Albrecht and asked him to procure insurance covering Harris' architect 
offices. Id. at 330. The parties had discussed business insurance once before. Id. at 335. 
Harris decided to purchase business coverage in 1997, rather than previously, because he 
had recently upgraded the equipment in his offices, and, consequently, had a greater need 
for business insurance than ever before. Id. at 345-50. In the 1997 conversation, 
Albrecht agreed to procure business insurance coverage for Harris's architect offices. Id. 
at 330. After the conversation, Harris felt that his business was covered, and he felt like 
that particular task had been accomplished. Id. He had confidence in Albrecht, based on 
the parties' past relationship, that Albrecht would take care of his request, as Albrecht 
had done every time in the past. Id. Albrecht agreed that this confidence and reliance 
was reasonable. Id. at 271, 273. 
The parties" eight-year course of dealing shows that Harris had always relied on 
Albrecht to find the requested coverage for a reasonable price (a factor that would include 
both duration and premium) and within reasonable limits. Thus, these remaining 
additional contractual terms can be implied with sufficient particularity from the parties' 
past course of dealing. 
Moreover, these terms can also be gleaned, at least to some extent, from the terms 
and conditions of State Farm Fire & Casualty Company's standard business insurance 
policy.16 Many of the terms and conditions of that standard business policy are found in 
the State Farm business/commercial insurance brochure. See R. at 360-65. According to 
the brochure, "State Farm's Business Policy" will provide "[c]omprehensive coverage for 
your building & business personal property," meaning that "your property will be insured 
against accidental direct physical loss from any cause not specifically excluded." Id. at 
364. The "[property covered includes" buildings, garages, storage buildings, auxiliary 
16
 Defendants assert that "there is no such thing as a 'standard' business policy." See 
Aplts.' Br., at 12. However, this contention is belied by Defendants' argument before the 
district court that "with respect to valuable papers, plaintiff would have needed to decide 
whether he was satisfied with the $5,000 available under the standard policy or whether 
he wanted additional coverage at an additional cost." See R. at 195 (emphasis added). 
As discussed above, there certainly is a standard State Farm business policy, which of 
course can be varied from customer to customer at the customer's request. 
buildings, floor coverings, furniture, fixtures, glass, appliances, equipment, merchandise, 
and other items. Id. In addition, the insured "will have all of these additional coverages 
at no additional premium": "valuable papers and records—up to $5,000"; "personal 
effects"; coverage for loss of income; and many other items. Id. Certainly, this standard 
policy can be varied from customer to customer as the customer requests, but there can be 
no doubt that there is in fact a standard baseline State Farm business policy from which 
some of the terms of the parties' contract to procure insurance can be drawn. 
In fact, State Farm field underwriter Dick Mirabelli testified that this standard 
policy, had it been in effect at the time of the fire that consumed Harris's business, would 
have covered nearly all of the items damaged in the fire (with the exception of some 
items that were solely personal property and not business property). See id. at 239-41. 
Harris and Albrecht, over a period of eight years, had developed a relationship in 
which Harris gave Albrecht a great amount of leeway to come up with the particulars of 
the insurance coverage Harris requested. Time and time again, valid insurance policies 
went into effect without Harris ever having told Albrecht to obtain insurance, for 
The district court refused to consider the brochure, because "Plaintiff didn't see the 
brochure or know of its contents until this litigation was commenced." See R. at 486. 
This was error. Harris, for more than eight years, had relied on Albrecht's expertise, and 
had allowed him great latitude in filling in the details of the insurance policies he 
requested down through the years. Based on this relationship, and absent a phone call 
from Albrecht requesting additional information, Harris had every reason to expect 
Albrecht to fill in some of the unspoken terms of the requested business insurance policy 
from the "standard policy" outlined in the brochure. Indeed, given the way the 
relationship between Harris and Albrecht had historically functioned, this is precisely the 
type of source that Harris would have expected Albrecht to use to fill in some of the 
details of the insurance. 
instance, at a certain premium or for a certain duration. Harris let Albrecht fill in the 
details, and relied upon Albrecht's considerable expertise in doing so. And the 
relationship had functioned without a hitch until 1997. Under these conditions, the 
particulars of the insurance Harris requested in 1997—to the extent these particulars are 
not evident from the parties' short conversation in 1997—can be inferred from the 
parties' past relationship, notably Harris's long-term reliance on Albrecht's expertise, and 
from the particulars of the standard State Farm business policy set forth in the brochure. 
See Hamacher, 352 P.2d at 497 (stating that "a contract [to procure insurance] could arise 
even though the agent was given the authority to ascertain some of the facts essential to 
the creation of the ultimate contract of insurance, such as the appraised value of the 
property to be covered or the most advantageous premium"). 
Given these facts and the applicable law, Harris and Albrecht, in 1997, entered 
into a valid and binding contract to procure insurance. At the very least, because the 
existence of an oral contract is a question of fact for the jury, a genuine issue of material 
fact remains on this point. The district court's entry of summary judgment on this claim 
was improper, and should be reversed. 
It must also be remembered that, as discussed above, Albrecht is the expert (and Harris 
the layman) when it comes to insurance matters. If Albrecht had really needed additional 
information in order to issue the policy, it is his duty as the expert (and not Harris's duty 
as a layman) to follow up with Harris to obtain the specific information needed. 
III. STATE FARM IS LIABLE ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
Finally, State Farm is liable for Albrecht's actions in failing to procure the 
business insurance Harris requested, because, at all times relevant to this action, Albrecht 
was acting as an agent of State Farm, and had authority to bind State Farm. 
There is no dispute that Albrecht is an "agent" of some type for State Farm. 
Indeed, the record demonstrates that Albrecht sells only State Farm insurance products, 
and does not sell insurance from any other insurance company. See R. at 304. The Utah 
Legislature has proclaimed that 
[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that every insurer is bound by any act of 
its agent performed in this state that is within the scope of the agent's actual 
(express or implied) or apparent authority, until the insurer has canceled the 
agent's appointment and has made reasonable efforts to recover from the 
agent its policy forms and other indicia of agency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-23-305 (emphasis added). Thus, the agent's acts bind the 
insurance company when the agent's acts are within the scope of the agent's authority. 
Applied to this case, this Utah statute means that State Farm is bound by the acts of Rick 
Albrecht when Albrecht's acts are within the scope of his authority. 
The record clearly demonstrates that Albrecht's act of offering to procure 
insurance for Harris was within the scope of his authority. Albrecht testified that he has 
authority to bind State Farm, up to certain limits, on all policies, including commercial 
insurance policies. See R. at 290. State Farm field underwriter Dick Mirabelli confirmed 
this, testifiying that State Farm grants its agents—including Albrecht—authority to bind 
State Farm, id. at 261, 263-64, and that the binding authority granted by State Farm to 
Albrecht was specifically set forth in Deposition Exhibit 2, id. at 358. That exhibit page 
is entitled "Your Binding Authority," and states that State Farm had granted Albrecht 
authority to bind the company up to specified limits set forth there. See id. 
Albrecht clearly had authority to bind State Farm up to certain limits. Thus, 
Albrecht's actions in offering to procure insurance for Harris were performed within the 
scope of Albrecht's authority, and State Farm is therefore bound by those acts, at least up 
to the limits of Albrecht's undisputed binding authority. 
CONCLUSION 
When Ken Harris telephoned Rick Albrecht during mid-summer 1997 and asked 
Albrecht to procure insurance on Harris's business, and when Albrecht assured Harris 
that he would take care of the request, Albrecht assumed a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in the procurement of the requested insurance. This duty, at a minimum, requires the 
insurance agent to either (1) actually procure the insurance, or (2) follow-up with the 
client to obtain further information or to tell the client that the insurance, for whatever 
reason, cannot be procured. Albrecht did none of these things—in fact, Albrecht did 
nothing at all. By his actions (or, more accurately, his inactions), Albrecht breached his 
duty to exercise reasonable care in the procurement of the requested insurance, and, in 
addition, Albrecht breached the contract to procure insurance that the parties had entered 
into during the telephone conversation. At the very least, genuine issues of material fact 
remain regarding these issues, because, as stated above, issues related to breaches of duty 
are questions of fact for the jury, as are questions related to the formation of oral 
contracts. For all the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court should be 
reversed, and this case should be remanded to the district court for trial. 
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